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REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS, ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

John W. Teeter, Jr.* and Christopher Bumett**

It seems to be almost a law of human nature that it is easierfor
people to agree on a negative program-on the hatred of an enemy,
on the envy of those better off-than on any positive task. The
contrastbetween the "we" and the "they, " the common fight against
those outside the group, seems to be an essential ingredient in any
creed which will solidly knit together a groupfor common action.1
-

F.A. Hayek

Anti-Semitism 2 exists in our nation's labor relations, both in the
factory 3 and in the corporate setting. 4 Although it may be difficult to
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1 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 153 (anniversary ed. 1994).
2 An "anti-Semite" may be defined simply as a person who is hostile toward or prejudiced
against Jews. American Heritage College Dictionary 60 (3d ed. 1993). The term "anti-Semitism" in
fact was coined by Wilhelm Marr, who wanted a new term to replace the German word Judenhass
(Jew-hatred) so that anti-Jewish bigots would appear less vulgar and more scientific. Joseph
Telushkin, Jewish Literacy 467 (1991). Rabbi Telushkin advocates using "antisemite" instead of
"anti-Semite" to underscore that anti-Semitism is not directed at all Semitic peoples, but at Jews
alone. Id. Alan M. Dershowitz suggests that "Judeopath" is preferable to "anti-Semite" because the
former connotes "the sickness and evil inherent in such bigotry." Alan M. Dershowitz, Chutzpah
121 (1991). We will use the various terms interchangeably.
A related issue is whether anti-Semitism should be conceptualized as ethnic, racial, or religious
bigotry. According to Rabbis Kertzer and Hoffman, Jews properly are characterized as a religious
or cultural group rather than as a race. Morris N. Kertzer & Lawrence A. Hoffman, What is a Jew?
7-8 (1993). As they explain, Jews once were considered an ethnic group, but "[tihe ethnic
definition is going the way of the dinosaur." Id. at 8. Neither the courts nor the National Labor
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quantify, 5 such bigotry undermines employee freedom and workplace
democracy in several significant ways. This Article focuses on one vital
aspect of work-related anti-Semitism, the use of anti-Jewish tactics in
labor representation elections. Both unions and employers have resorted to
anti-Semitic campaign ploys to garner the votes of workers. This
Judeopathic practice has proved to be a vexing problem for both the
National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") and the federal courts.
Unfortunately, the Board has been inexcusably permissive in its
response to anti-Semitic propaganda, repeatedly minimizing its possible
effects on electoral results. This is not to say that the Board and its agents'
knowingly have condoned anti-Semitism. It is undeniable, however, that
Relations Board have characterized anti-Semitism consistently as being either religious or racial
hostility, and this distinction has apparently not been determinative in their decisions.
3 Some observers assert that anti-Semitism appears particularly entrenched among blue-collar
workers. See, e.g., David Singer & Renae Cohen, Probing Public Sentiment on Israel and American
Jews 15 (1987) (finding that ten percent of blue-collar workers but only four percent of their whitecollar counterparts believe that Jews have too much power in the United States); Stewart J.
D'Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg, Anti-Semitism in America: The Dynamics of Prejudice, 61 Soc.
Inquiry 359, 360 (1991) (stating that blue-collar workers "are reported to be virulent toward
members of the Jewish faith"). Further, two scholars have concluded that "the tendency of bluecollar workers to be anti-Semitic is largely a function of their lesser education." Gertrude J.
Selznick & Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in Contemporary
America 76 (1969).
4

Corporate anti-Semitism also has deep roots and continuing consequences. See, e.g., Robert P.
Quinn et al., The Chosen Few: A Study of Discrimination in Executive Selection 30 (3d ed. 1973)
("Anti-Semitic attitudes appear to constitute a substantial stumbling block for companies
attempting to implement policies of equal opportunity."); Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew
35-37 (George J. Becker trans., Schocken Books Inc. 1995) (1948) (arguing that anti-Semitism is
more common among the middle class than among workers); Stephen L. Slavin & Mary A. Pradt,
The Einstein Syndrome: Corporate Anti-Semitism in America Today 2 (1982) (contending that
Jews are "systematically excluded from.., the corporate mainstream"); Abraham K. Korman,
Anti-Semitism in Organizations and the Behavioral Sciences: Towards a Theory of Discrimination
in Work Settings, 9 Contemp. Jewry 63, 69-70 (1988) (finding "considerable evidence to indicate
that Jews are less likely to be selected for the higher-levels of American corporations than would be
indicated by their general level of education and their frequency in the population from which
managers and executives are normally drawn"); Samuel Z. Klausner, Anti-Semitism in the
Executive Suite, Moment, Sept. 1988, at 33, 55 (cautioning that "the current decline in executive
discrimination against Jews does not guarantee that this situation will persist").
5 Scholars have emphasized the inherent difficulties in measuring anti-Jewish attitudes. See, e.g.,
Simon Epstein, Cyclical Patterns in Antisemitism: The Dynamics of Anti-Jewish Violence in
Western Countries Since the 1950's 17 (1993) (cautioning that "any effort to quantify antisemitism
comes up against considerable psychological resistance"); Tom W. Smith, Actual Trends or
Measurement Artifacts? A Review of Three Studies of Anti-Semitism, 57 Pub. Op. Q. 380, 380-81
(1993) (noting that "numerous methodological differences across the studies seriously undermine
their comparability and compromise the examination of changes in anti-Semitism"); Lucy S.
Dawidowicz, Can Anti-Semitism Be Measured?, Commentary, July 1970, at 36 (asserting that
surveys are inherently "unequipped to investigate the historic images and themes of anti-Semitism
which still flourish in the American variety").
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Anti-Semitism and the NLRB

the Board has been inconsistent in applying its own remedial standard to
this problem. This inconsistency-to give the Board the benefit of the
doubt-stems from a combination of ignorance, confusion, and a reflexive
adherence to bad precedent.
The issue, then, is how the Board should address anti-Semitism in
labor representation elections. In particular, we address the question of
when anti-Semitic behavior or propaganda by unions, employers,
employees, or others should constitute grounds for invalidating an election
and ordering a new vote. This requires examining whether the Board and
the courts consistently have applied the doctrine of Sewell Manufacturing
Co.6 to representation elections involving anti-Semitic behavior. We
conclude that the Board has been haphazard and lax in applying Sewell in
cases involving anti-Semitism, whereas the federal appellate courts have
applied Sewell more consistently to purge elections of anti-Jewish
misconduct.
The federal courts have been more vigilant than the Board, and
frequently have refused to enforce Board orders that trivialize antiSemitism. 7 This divergence between the Board and reviewing courts may
be the result of a pattern of nonacquiescence on the part of the Board. A
federal circuit court has the power to review appeals from the Board's
decisions and to enforce, modify, or set aside such orders. 8 That does not
mean, however, that the Board must adhere to a circuit court's ruling in its
own subsequent decisions. As the Board has declared:
It has been the Board's consistent policy for itself to
determine whether to acquiesce in the contrary views of a
circuit court of appeals or whether, with due deference to
the court's opinion, to adhere to its previous holding until
the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled
otherwise. 9
Such independence raises obvious problems. As the Board diverges from
the circuit courts and the circuit courts fragment among themselves, the
6 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962) (holding that inflammatory appeals to racial prejudice are prohibited in
the conduct of labor representation elections).
7 See general discussion in Part H, Sections B & C.
8 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1994) (empowering a United States court of appeals "to make and enter a
decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the
order of the Board").
9 Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768, 773 (1957), enforcement denied, 260 F.2d
736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). Of course, a circuit court is not compelled to
accept the Board's nonacquiescence in subsequent cases.
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law becomes increasingly unclear and the amount of appellate litigation
(with all its expenses and delays) multiplies. 10 This indeterminacy is
worsened by the forum shopping that results as parties direct appeals to
circuits that seem to favor their positions."I Judicial review is thus a spotty
palliative for anti-Jewish campaign ploys in labor representation elections.
Any lasting, systemic cure must come from the Board itself.
Labor disputes, unfortunately, are laden with instances of anti-Semitic
behavior, especially in cases involving firings, 12 contentious strikes, 13 and
union organizing efforts. 14 Fortunately, the number of cases involving
appeals to anti-Semitic prejudice during representation election campaigns
is relatively modest. In a very real sense, however, these cases are even

10 See, e.g., Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 511 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining that if
there is doctrinal confusion, then "there will be much litigation, including much appellate
litigation").
11 As two scholars have noted, "When an NLRB order renders both the union (or employee) and
the employer 'aggrieved,' it is possible for petitions to be filed in three different circuits-setting in
motion a 'race to the courthouse' that is only partially mitigated by recent legislation." Samuel
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale
L.J. 679, 706 (1989) (footnote omitted). Estreicher and Revesz, however, recognize "the legitimacy
of an agency's desire to maintain a uniform administration of its governing statute while it
reasonably seeks the national validation of its preferred position." Id. at 771. See also Scott Kafker,
Nonacquiescence by the NLRB: Combat Versus Collaboration, 3 Lab. Law. 137, 162 (1987)
(discussing the nonacquiescence debate in the context of "the state of war that sometimes seems to
exist between the Board and the courts of appeals").
12 See, e.g., Animal Humane Soc'y of S. Jersey, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 50 (1987) (upholding
discharge of employee who used an anti-Semitic slur against his employer); National Council of
Young Israel, 276 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1985) (ordering that discharged employee who had been accused
of making a profane anti-Semitic insult be placed on preferential hiring list); Pine Valley Meats,
Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 402 (1981) (reinstating employee notwithstanding anti-Jewish remark made by
him); Seaport Manor, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 886 (1980) (ordering reinstatement of employee who
allegedly made Judeopathic comment); Flavorpipe Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976) (reinstating
employee who had been accused of painting anti-Semitic graffiti).
13 See, e.g., Domsey Trading Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 777 (1993) (reinstating striking employees who
chanted anti-Semitic slogans during a particularly contentious strike), enforced, 16 F.3d 517 (2d
Cir. 1994); Aztec Bus Lines, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1988) (refusing to order reinstatement of
profane and violent strikers who employed anti-Semitic slurs along with other offensive
comments,); Nassau Ins. Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 878 (1986) (discussing a non-striking employee who
was subjected to anti-Jewish insults by a striker on the picket lines).
14 See, e.g., Fresh Mark, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 127 (1996) (stating in regard to alleged actions of a
union organizer that absent other actions, making a Nazi salute and goose-step can be construed as
a political statement as opposed to anti-Semitic acts); Batavia Nursing and Convalescent Inn, 275
N.L.R.B. 886 (1985) (discussing assault of union organizer by Jewish management attorney for
allegedly making anti-Semitic slur); Clark Manor Nursing Home Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 455 (1981)
(discussing disgruntled former union supporter referring to union organizers in an anti-Semitic
manner), enforced as modified, 671 F.2d 657 (Ist Cir. 1982); Glass Guard Indus., 218 N.L.R.B.
176 (1975) (noting union business agent's alleged comment that "Hitler had not killed enough
Jews").
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more pernicious than those involving individual firings or strikes. AntiSemitic appeals during representation campaigns are particularly insidious
because attempts, either planned or spontaneous, to influence election
outcomes through appeals to irrational prejudice affect the exercise of the
democratic franchise. As analyzed below, however, it is clear that Board
members have much to learn from their judicial brethren when it comes to
deterring the use of anti-Semitic tactics in representation campaigns.
I. FREEDOM To CHOOSE
The National Labor Relations Act 15 (the "Act") empowers workers to
choose through representation elections whether a union shall represent
them for purposes of collective bargaining. Employers and unions
typically wage robust campaigns for the workers' allegiance and the
process commonly concludes with a secret ballot election administered by

the Board. 16 These campaigns are regulated closely by the Board to ensure
that workers are able to make a free and informed choice. The Board will
vacate an election and order new balloting when it concludes that the
workers' freedom of choice may have been compromised. 17 Examples of
such interference could include an employer's resort to unlawful
discharges 18 or bribes, 19 a union's reliance on intimidation tactics, 20 or

15 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
16 Id. § 159(c)(1)(B) ("If the Board finds ... a question of representation exists, it shall direct an
election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.").
17 For excellent discussions of the Board's role, see Robert E. Williams, NLRB Regulation of
Election Conduct (rev. ed. 1985); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 495 (1993); Derek C. Bok, The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38 (1964).
18 See, e.g., Morehead City Garment Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 245 (1951) (finding that employer had
discharged employees in order to discourage union activity), enforced as modified, 191 F.2d 1021
(4th Cir. 1951) (per curiam).
19 See, e.g., The Borden Mfg. Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1971) (affirming finding of hearing officer
that employer had promised to be more generous in granting benefits to employees if the union lost
the election); Paterson Fire Brick Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1118 (1951) (affirming finding of hearing
officer that employer had promised to rehire a laid-off employee if the union lost the election);
Wytheville Knitting Mills, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 640 (1948) (finding that company president had
offered substantial insurance benefits to workers in the event that the union lost the election).
20 See, e.g., Knapp-Sherrill Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1968) (upholding finding of hearing officer
that workers had been threatened with possible job loss or other employment difficulties if they did
not support the union); G.H. Hess, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 463 (1949) (affirming finding of hearing
officer that union had threatened anti-union worker with economic reprisal and possible bodily
harm if she voted in the election).
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suggest a lack of
even actions by the Board's own agents that could
21
election.
the
of
outcome
impartiality regarding the
When either the employer or the union loses an election, it may file
objections with the Board's regional director alleging that the voting
process was contaminated. The regional director has broad discretion to
decide whether such objections warrant investigation and may order a
hearing to resolve the matter. If any objections are sustained, the results of
the balloting are voided and the Board typically schedules a new election.
If, in contrast, the objections are found meritless, the Board will certify the
22
election results.
The employer is not permitted to seek direct judicial review of an
election's legitimacy when the Board certifies the union as the workers'23
collective bargaining representative over the employer's objections.
Instead, the employer commonly refuses to bargain with the union,
prompting the union to file charges under section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 24 The
Board usually invokes a summary judgment procedure and issues an order
finding the employer guilty of an unfair labor practice and directing it to
bargain with the union. The employer then may seek judicial review under
section 10(025 or wait for the Board to pursue judicial enforcement under
section 10(e). 26 In this convoluted manner, the employer obtains judicial
review of its underlying objections to the election.
In its landmark General Shoe Corp.27 decision, the Board emphasized
its responsibility for ensuring the sanctity of elections. As part of a
21 See, e.g., Hudson Aviation Serv., 288 N.L.R.B. 870 (1988) (invalidating election on grounds
that Board agent had quarreled with employer's assistant manager in front of workers); Athbro
Precision Eng'g Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967) (vacating election where Board agent drank beer
with union representative during a break in the polling), vacated sub nom. International Union of
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C. 1968), acq. in result,
171 N.L.R.B. 21 (1968), enforced, 423 F.2d 573 (1st Cir. 1970).
22 See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60-102.82 (1997) (detailing procedures for issues concerning
representation of employees); Williams, supra note 17, at 15-20.
23 The Supreme Court unanimously held in American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401
(1940), that direct judicial review of the Board's certification decisions is not permitted due to
limitations in the relevant statute and legislative intent. Id. at 409-11. The only exception is when
there are extraordinary circumstances requiring immediate judicial attention. See, e.g., Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958) (permitting suit "to strike down an order of the Board made in
excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act").
24 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (providing that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees").
25 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (authorizing parties to seek judicial review of the Board's orders).
26 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (authorizing the Board to pursue judicial enforcement of its orders).
27 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
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"captive audience speech," 28 the employer had referred to the union
organizer in terms suggesting an appeal to anti-Semitic sentiment.
"Incidentally," the employer stated, "this man Burke of St. Louis, is not
really named Burke, but Berg, a Jewish man from Brooklyn, New York.
The Union formed here in Pulaski would be under his jurisdiction. '29 The
trial examiner interpreted this as an appeal to anti-Semitism 30 and
concluded that, in conjunction with other coercive comments by the
employer, 3' it constituted sufficient grounds for overturning the
employer's electoral victory and ordering a new election. 32 The Board
agreed, emphasizing the need to preserve the integrity of elections:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to
provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of employees. It is our
duty to establish those conditions; it is also our duty to
determine whether they have been fulfilled. When, in the
rare extreme case, the standard drops too low, because of
our fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory
conditions are not present and the experiment must be
33
conducted over again.

General Shoe was promising: the Board plainly acknowledged its duty
to protect "laboratory conditions" and effectively condemned the use of
anti-Semitic innuendo. Furthermore, in its celebrated 1962 Sewell
Manufacturing Co. 34 decision, the Board established the standard by
which racial, ethnic, and religious propaganda in representation elections
are to be judged. In Sewell, an employer in the deep South distributed
28 In a captive audience speech, the employer requires workers to gather during working time and
listen to anti-union arguments. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 17, at 269-88 (discussing
development of Board doctrine on employer speeches at the workplace). The Board upheld the
lawfulness of such speeches in Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948), but they
commonly have been criticized as inherently coercive. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 17, at 559
(asserting that "such conduct involves an element of coercion easily distinguishable from
expression").
29 General Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. at 138.

30 Id. at 139.
31 These other comments included a warning by a foreman to a union member that he would
regret the decision to vote for a union and a foreman's appeal to racial prejudice while criticizing
the union. Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 127 (footnote omitted).
34 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
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racially inflammatory materials to its work force during the election
campaign. 35 The Board vacated the election results and promulgated what
is known today as the Sewell doctrine, whereby the injection of racial
issues into a campaign is viewed with deep suspicion as a potentially
inflammatory appeal to the voters' basest, most irrational instincts. As the
Board reasoned:
[Alppeals to racial prejudice on matters unrelated to the
election issues or to the union's activities are not mere
"prattle" or puffing. They have no place in Board electoral
campaigns. They inject an element which is destructive of
the very purpose of an election. They create conditions
which make impossible a sober, informed exercise of the
franchise. The Board does not intend to tolerate as
"electoral propaganda" appeals or arguments which can
have no purpose except to inflame the racial feelings of
36
voters in the election.
For these reasons, the use of racial propaganda constitutes grounds for
vacating the speaker's electoral victory unless the statement is truthful,
racial
germane, and temperate in tone. 37 Furthermore, the party making the
38
statement has the burden of proving that these conditions are met.
The promise of General Shoe and Sewell, however, proved to be shortlived. In subsequent years the Board has been weak, vacillating, and
disturbingly indifferent to anti-Semitic sentiments in elections. All too
often, parties have been forced to resort to the appellate courts for the
35 Id. at 67-68. These materials included a racist newspaper, pictures of interracial dancers, and
repeated efforts to link the union withintegration and social "race-mixing." Id. at 67-68, 72.
36 Id. at71.
37 Id. at 71-72.
38 Id. at 72. Sewell has generated significant commentary on the Board's proper role, if any, in the

regulation of ethnic hate speech as a form of campaign propaganda. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Beadles
& Christopher M. Lowery, Union Elections Involving Racial Propaganda: The Sewell and Bancroft
Standards, 42 Lab. L.J. 418 (1991) (examining Board policy and court decisions concerning

racially-based electioneering); Charlotte LeMoyne, Comment, The Unresolved Problem of Race
Hate Speech in Labor Union Elections, 4 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 77 (1993) (calling for the
Board to deregulate racially oriented speech in elections); Daniel H. Pollitt, The National Labor
Relations Board and Race Hate Propaganda in Union Organization Drives, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 373
(1965) (promoting dialogue as the antidote to racial hate speech); Rudolf Sachs, The Racial Issue as
an Antiunion Tool and the National Labor Relations Board, 14 Lab. L.J. 849 (1963) (advocating
stricter Board regulation of racial speech); Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation
Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 356 (1995) (arguing that
employer campaign speech should be denied any constitutional protection); Note, Employee
Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 Yale L.J. 1243
(1963) (questioning the coherence and workability of the Sewell standard).
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vindication of their claims that laboratory conditions were ruined by antiJewish tactics.
II.

NEW SHOES: THE BOARD'S COMPLACENCY
TOWARD ANTI-SEMITISM

For the past forty years, the Board has compiled a dismal record of
indifference towards Judeopathic campaign ploys. This record falls into
three distinct eras. First was the Paula Shoe39 period, during which the
Board cryptically adopted a laissez-faire approach to anti-Semitism. This
was followed by a period of judicial reaction, during which appellate
courts repeatedly reversed the Board's orders in an effort to ensure
campaign decency. Finally, there is the current period of administrative
intransigence, in which the Board continues to ignore judicial opinion and
remains passive in the midst of anti-Jewish electioneering. Each era is
discussed in turn.
A. The Other Shoe Drops
In Paula Shoe Co., the Board inexplicably abandoned the role of
vigilant watchdog it had proclaimed for itself ten years earlier in General
Shoe Corp.40 In Paula Shoe, the employer challenged the union's victory
because the union had distributed a handbill containing an anti-Semitic
remark. Referring to the plant manager, the union's handbill stated: "'If
you want to avoid that the Jew Sandler continue to mistreat you, vote for
UTM.' ' 41 As the employer reasoned, this slur was "designed to incite
racial and religious prejudice against its plant manager and thus impair a
free choice by the employees in the election. ' 42 The Board disagreed,

39 121 N.L.R.B. 673 (1958).
40 Paula Shoe, 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). The fickle nature of Board precedents has been
recognized and accepted by reviewing courts. As the Seventh Circuit explained:
It is... clear that the Board's previous decisions do not bind it in later
proceedings with anything like the force of the doctrine of stare decisis in the
courts. The Board is free to change its mind on matters of law that are within its
competence to determine, provided it gives a reasoned analysis in support of
the change.
Local 1384, UAW v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 1985). See also NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265 (1975) (reasoning that "[t]he use by an administrative agency of the
evolutional approach is particularly fitting").
41 General Shoe, 121 N.L.R.B. at 675-76.
42 ld. at 676.
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however, and held that this slur was insufficient to spoil the election. 43
While claiming that it did not "condone appeals to prejudice," the Board
concluded that "the mere mention of
a racial or religious issue is not
44
grounds for setting aside an election.
Such reasoning fails to pass muster. First, this was not the "mere
mention" of ethnicity, but a deliberate effort to arouse anti-Jewish
sentiments. Second, the Board's emphasis that this was a solitary
occurrence is worrisome: it implies there is an acceptable level of Jewbashing that parties can undertake without facing adverse consequences.
Third, the Board was myopic in arguing that this was an isolated event
when the handbill was distributed to 139 eligible voters. Paula Shoe thus
signals a Board less committed to cleansing elections of all anti-Semitic
appeals.
Although Paula Shoe was decided prior to Sewell Manufacturing
Corp.,4 5 the Board's anemic response to Judeopathic tactics has continued

in the post-Sewell era. In Maple Shade Nursing Home, Inc. ,46 for example,
the Board belittled the effects of anti-Semitic behavior during union
organizational meetings. Here, the employer objected that union
organizers and employees ridiculed him by imitating his heavy "Jewish"
accent during several meetings. 47 Despite such ridicule, the administrative
law judge ("ALJ") opined:
I am reminded of an ancient line of Board cases that speak
of union activities not being any form of tea party. The
Union did nothing here to inflame irrational prejudices, and
the employees laughed at their own jokes. There is no basis
in this evidence for finding disrespect on the part of the
employees towards their employer. I find no merit in this
objection .... 48
Once again, such reasoning is unpersuasive. While it is beyond
question that representation campaigns are robust affairs, with rough

43 Id. Apparently adopting a "one free bite" philosophy, the Board stressed that the handbill
contained the only anti-Semitic reference of the campaign. Id.
44

Id.

45

138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).

46 223 N.L.R.B. 1475 (1976).
47 Id. at 1483-84.
48 Id. at 1484.
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language and indelicate name-calling, 49 racial ridicule is clearly different
in kind than the everyday use of intemperate language. Generalized
profanity simply cannot be equated with repeated "jesting" assaults on a
person's ethnic identity and cultural attributes. 50 The AL, however,
seemed to conclude that prejudice directed at Jews is acceptable as long as
the perpetrators find it amusing. Furthermore, in addition to being
insensitive, the ALJ also appears to have been ignorant of the standard
Board doctrine that "joking" is no defense. 51 Despite these problems, the
ALJ's decision without even mentioning the antiBoard adopted the
52
Semitic incident.
B. JudicialFootsteps

The Board's refusal to deter anti-Jewish tactics prompted a salutary
judicial reaction. In the 1980s, a dialectical pattern emerged whereby the
courts repeatedly rejected the Board's certification of elections tainted by
49 As the Supreme Court has observed, "[Riepresentation campaigns are frequently characterized
by bitter and extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal
accusations, misrepresentations and distortions. Both labor and management often speak bluntly
and recklessly, embellishing their respective positions with imprecatory language." Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966) (citing Cafeteria Union v.
Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943)).
50 Numerous courts and commentators have realized the malevolent undercurrents of much ethnic
and sexual "humor." As Professor MacKinnon reports, "A computer search of federal sexual and
racial harassment cases through 1992 yields 144 cases that involve alleged jokes. Usually the courts
are not laughing." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words 128 n.14 (1993). See, e.g., Snell v.
Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521, 529 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (differentiating "idle banter among friends
and comrades" from "sharp and cutting slurs designed to demean, harass and intimidate"), aff'd,
782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986). For perceptive analyses of ethnic humor, see John H. Burma, Humor
as a Technique in Race Conflict, 11 Am. Soc. Rev. 710, 710 (1946) (observing that "subtle barbs
often strike more telling blows than gratuitous insult or rational argument"); Christie Davies, Ethnic
jokes, moral values and social boundaries, 33 British J. Soc. 383, 400 (1982) (discussing the role of
such humor in reducing anxiety and providing a sense of legitimization); Nicholas J. Gadfield et al.,
Dynamics of Humor in Ethnic Group Relations, 6 Ethnicity 373, 373 (1979) (relating conventional
wisdom that ethnic jokes "are most appreciated when they attack group members with whom one
does not identify and does not like"). As Professor Burma concluded, "Any persons or groups who
are the butt of [ethnic] jokes thereby suffer discriminatory treatment and are indirectly being
relegated to an inferior status." Burma, supra at 714-15.
51 As the Board explained in Conagra, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 609 (1980), "It is no defense that a
violation is committed in a friendly or joking manner." Id. at 609. See also Ethyl Corp., 231
N.L.R.B. 431, 434 (1977) (explaining that "the coercive and unlawful effect of a statement is not
blunted merely because... [such remarks] are accompanied by laughter or made in an offhand
humorous way").
52 Maple Shade, 223 N.L.R.B. at 1475-76. After the Board's initial decision, the employer
attempted to have the issue reconsidered, but the Board refused. See Maple Shade Nursing Home,
Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1457 (1977). Instead, the Board dismissively found that the issue of antiSemitism had been raised and decided during the prior hearing. Id. at 1458.
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bigotry. It thus has been the circuit courts, and not the Board, that have
endeavored to preserve the sanctity of elections.
In NLRB v. Silverman's Men's Wear, Inc.,53 the Board drew judicial
ire for its failure to respond to an anti-Semitic statement. In Silverman's,
the regional director had refused to hold a hearing to investigate a union
officer's alleged remark to employees that the company's vice-president
was a "'stingy Jew."' 54 The regional director assumed that the remark
actually was made, but held that it did "not afford a sufficient basis for
setting aside an election." 55 Relying on Paula Shoe, he characterized the
slur as "'[a] single, casual reference to a party's religious or ethnic
background in a campaign otherwise free of racial hostility." 56 He opined
that Sewell, in light of Paula Shoe, held that "'only a deliberate and
sustained appeal to racial prejudice which seeks to overstress and
appeals affords a
exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant, inflammatory...
57
election."'
Board
a
aside
sufficient basis for setting
The Third Circuit found this argument meritless. As the court
reasoned, "If the Union leader had desired to stress the executive's
parsimony, he could have referred to 'stingy Silverman' or the 'stingy
vice-president.' Instead, he allegedly resorted to a disreputable stratagem
of bigots. The man's religion was not germane to the proper purposes of
this election effort."'58 The Third Circuit took particular exception to the
Board's reliance on Paula Shoe. As the court emphasized, that decision
was hardly a model to emulate:
In Paula Shoe Co., the Board, without a prior hearing,
rejected an objection to an election based on the union's
inclusion in a handbill of a slur similar in character to the
one now before us. Frankly, we find such a conclusion,
reached without benefit of a hearing to determine the
circumstances and likely impact of such a statement, to be
inconsistent with the Board's professed position that "it

13 656 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
54 Id. at 57.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 58.

57 Id. (emphasis omitted). Even more disturbing, the Board argued in its appellate brief that the
racist jab was "marginally germane" to the election. Id. at 58 n.7.
58 Id.
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does not condone appeals to prejudice," and we reject it as
an anomaly. 59
Furthermore, the Board had ignored the essence of Sewell's condemnation
of racial hate speech. The court interpreted Sewell as holding that "an
effective appeal to racial or religious prejudice prima facie warrants
setting aside an election. '60 Viewed through this lens, the facts of
Silverman 's
disclose an utterance that falls well within the proscription
of that general rule. In making a remark such as the one
involved here, a party does not simply set forth another
party's position on matters of racial interest. Indeed, the
remark, rather than identifying any position of the
Employer, can typically serve only to spotlight the minority
religion of the Company's principal. Such a remark has no
purpose except blatantly to exploit religious prejudices of
the voters. 61
Finally, as the court stated, an essential reason for strict enforcement
of Sewell is that it sends a clear signal to all current and any future parties
"that the Board will back up with action, not just tongue clicking, its
position that it does not condone appeals to racial prejudice. '62 The court,
therefore, denied enforcement of the Board's bargaining order and
remanded the case for a hearing on the issue of whether the alleged
63
comment was made and the extent to which it infected the election.
Silverman's merits our modest applause. The decision is praiseworthy
in that it places the necessary emphasis on the fact that Paula Shoe was
fundamentally flawed, that it effectively has been superseded by Sewell,
and that there should be no tolerance of the venomous targeting of ethnic
or religious minorities in elections. It is disheartening, however, that such
basic lessons were iterated for the first time by an appellate court rather
than by the Board.
Even so, Silverman's is not free from ambiguity. In the midst of its
otherwise well-reasoned opinion, the court dropped a somewhat ominous
59 Id. at 59 (citation omitted). The court also explained that "Sewell stripped the earlier result in
PaulaShoe of any possible rationale." Id.
60 Id. at 58.
61

Id.

62 Id. at 59 n.9. Unfortunately, as this Article illustrates, the Board repeatedly has ignored this
distinction between lip service and effective deterrence.
63 Id. at 60.
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note, stating: "We need not now speculate whether there could ever be a
blatant ethnic slur, having no other purpose or possible effect than to
invoke irrelevant prejudices, that could properly be treated by the Board as
if it had never occurred. ' 64 This caveat raises troublesome issues. It is not
clear how a "blatant ethnic slur" could ever justifiably be ignored, and
there was no reason for the Third Circuit to speculate that there might
exist cases of harmless ethnic antagonism. This artless dicta merely left
room to maneuver for a Board with a clear history of ignoring,
minimizing, or excusing the impact of Judeopathic campaign tactics. It is
both curious and regrettable that the Silverman's court did not quit while it.
was ahead.
NLRB v. Katz65 illustrates the Board's disturbing pattern of failing to
investigate anti-Semitic incidents. In Katz, the anti-Semitic remarks came
not from a union or employer representative, but a local Catholic priest
sympathetic to the union's cause. 6 6 During a union meeting held at a
nearby church, this priest began his speech by discussing the movie
"Holocaust," a film about the Nazis' extermination of the Jews. 67 He then
argued that "'Paul and Mrs. Katz are Jewish and they're getting rich while
we're getting poor .... Jewish people are rich and we are poor and killing
ourselves for them." '' 68 The union, for its part, did not repudiate the
priest's comments. 69 Notwithstanding the campaign's anti-Jewish tenor,
the Board upheld the union's electoral victory and found the employer
70
guilty of an unlawful refusal to bargain.
As in Silverman's, however, the Board's effort to seek refuge in Paula
Shoe was rebuffed by the Seventh Circuit:
The Silverman's case is analogous to the case at bar. There
is no conceivable way in which either the movie
"Holocaust" or the Nazis' treatment of Jewish people
during World War II could be relevant to a legitimate
campaign issue. To the extent that the priest's comment
regarding the wealth of Jewish people, as juxtaposed to the
poverty of the employees, might be relevant to the
64 Id. at 58 n.8.
65 701 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1983), denying enforcement to 251 N.L.R.B. 1633 (1980).
66 Id. at 705.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 707.
70 251 N.L.R.B. 1633, 1635.
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campaign, the point could have been made without resort to
71
a religious slur.
The court concluded that even if Paula Shoe survived Sewell, it would still
professed position that 'it does
seem to be "inconsistent with the 'Board's
72
not condone appeals to prejudice.'
Of even greater significance, the court reasoned that the election had to
be vacated despite the fact that the prejudicial remarks came from a third
party rather than the company or the union. The court explained that "[t]he
relevant legal inquiry is whether the inflammatory remarks could have
'73
impaired the employees' freedom of choice in the subsequent election.
Given that most of the workers were Catholic, the priest was a vocal union
advocate, and the union never repudiated his bigoted remarks, there was a
strong likelihood that anti-Semitism impermissibly tainted the election's
the election and refused to
outcome. The Katz court, therefore, overturned
74
enforce the Board's bargaining order.
Katz is a critical extension of Silverman's. One weakness of Sewell
and its progeny is that they do not speak to the problem posed when third
parties-such as employees, onlookers, or clergy-interject ethnic hate
speech. Arguably, it is unfair to strip the victor of his electoral triumph
when he is not responsible for the slur. While this point has a certain
corrective justice appeal, it does not withstand scrutiny. First, even if the
prevailing party did not initiate the attack, he may well have benefited
from the ethnic animosity the slur aroused against his opponent. To uphold
such a tainted victory would thus constitute unjust enrichment regardless
of who dealt the ethnic card.
Second, the key focus should be on the workers themselves, as
opposed to the union or the employer. The decision whether to join a
union is one of the most critical choices in a worker's professional life. In
addition to affecting material concerns such as wages, hours, and job
security, voting is an essential statement of self-expression and collective
empowerment. In light of the need to make free, informed, and rational
decisions, workers are entitled to deliberate in a hate-free environment
regardless of the speaker's identity. Thus, the Katz doctrine represents a

71

701 F.2d at 706.

72 Id. at 707-8 (quoting Silverman's, 656 F.2d at 59 (quoting PaulaShoe, 121 N.L.R.B. at 676)).
73 Id. at 707 (citing Advertisers Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1982)).
74 Id. at 709.
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elections that
well-founded effort to ensure that workers cast ballots in 75
choice.
democratic
their
of
dignify the autonomy and gravity
Third-party anti-Semitism appeared again in M & M Supermarkets v.
NLRB. 76 Here, a pro-union employee launched into an anti-Jewish speech
during a meeting between several workers and the company's personnel
director. 77 The employee angrily charged:
The damn Jews who run this Company are all alike. They
pay us pennies out here in the warehouse, and take all their
money to the bank. The Jews ought to remember their
roots. [The company president] ought to remember his
roots. Us blacks were out in the cotton field while they, the
damned Jews, took their money from the poor hardworking
78
people.
75 Even Katz, however, is no guarantee that anti-Semitism will be deterred in every case. As the
Seventh Circuit's recent opinion in Clearwater Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2281 (7th Cir. 1998), exemplifies, parties objecting to an election's validity still must make an
affirmative showing that the ethnic smear may have had some impact on the election. In
Clearwater, the Seventh Circuit upheld the Board's decision that an employee's Judeopathic slur
did not breach laboratory conditions. As the court concluded, there was "a complete dearth of
evidence to back up" the employer's claim that the employee's anti-Semitic remark to coworkers
could have influenced the outcome of the election. Id. at 2287. Given Clearwater's recent vintage,
it is unclear whether the opinion marks a doctrinal retreat by the Seventh Circuit, or merely a
reminder that parties must do more than simply allege that an ethnic remark conceivably might
have had some hypothetical impact on balloting.
76 818 F.2d 1567 (11 th Cir. 1987).
77 Id. at 1569.
78 Id. M & M exemplifies how highly complex and sensitive the issue of anti-Semitism is among
African-Americans, an issue which is beyond the purview of this Article. As one scholar explains,
"[W]e know very little about the nature and extent of antisemitism in the black community."
Jerome A. Chanes, Interpreting the Data: Antisemitism and Jewish Security in the United States, 28
Patterns of Prejudice 87, 96 (1994). For additional discussion of this subject, see Gregory Martire &
Ruth Clark, Anti-Semitism in the United States: A Study of Prejudice in the 1980s 51-52 (1982)
(explaining that increased black social contact with Jews does not, as is the case with whites,
produce lower levels of anti-Semitism where the contact is often impersonal rather than social);
Gertrude J. Selznick & Stephen Steinberg, The Tenacity of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in
Contemporary America 117-31 (1969) (positing that, due to unique social realities, blacks are more
anti-Semitic than whites in the economic area); Stewart J. D'Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg, AntiSemitism in America: The Dynamics of Prejudice, 61 Soc. Inquiry 359, 363-64 (1991) (finding that
race has negligible direct effects on anti-Semitism); Lee Sigelman, Blacks, Whites, and AntiSemitism, 36 Soc. Q. 649 (1995) (stating that national surveys over the past 30 years indicate that
"blacks are more negatively oriented towards Jews than... whites"); Ronald Tadao Tsukashima &
Darrel Montero, The Contact Hypothesis: Social and Economic Contact and Generational Changes
in the Study of Black Anti-Semitism in Error Without Trial: Psychological Research on
Antisemitism 430-48 (Werner Bergmann ed., 1988) (suggesting that more intimate, equal-status
contact between blacks and Jews may not significantly improve Black-Jew relations). A hopeful
dialogue may be found in Michael Lerner & Cornel West, Jews and Blacks: Let the Healing Begin
(1995).
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The Board certified the union's victory in the election notwithstanding
the employer's objections. 79 According to the Board's hearing officer,
such remarks were not imputable to the union, were heard by only a few
employees, and were not so inflammatory as to render a fair election
impossible. 80 The Board, although claiming "that it has long been sensitive
and responsive to deliberate attempts by parties to inject elements of racial
and religious prejudice into a representation campaign," 81 upheld the
hearing officer's decision. The Board based this ruling on its philosophy
that "where racially prejudicial statements emanate from a third party,
such statements warrant invalidating an election, only if they are so
'coercive and disruptive that a free expression of choice of representatives
82
is impossible.'
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. Refusing to enforce the Board's order,
the court reasoned that:
[The employee's] remarks were so inflammatory and
derogatory that they inflamed racial and religious tensions
against the Jewish owners of the company and destroyed
the laboratory condition necessary for a free and open
election. The record shows that [the employee's] remarks
were made in front of three other employees. There were
17 employees in the bargaining unit, and the Union won the
election by a vote of nine to seven, with two challenged
ballots. 83
Given this finding, the court went on to hold that "the Board failed to
apply the proper legal standard to determine whether [the employee's]
remarks 'disrupted the voting procedure or destroyed the atmosphere
84
necessary to the exercise of a free choice in the representation election.'"
In making its decision, the court was careful to consider the potentially
broader implications of allowing such racially or religiously motivated
hate speech to continue unchecked:
We are mindful of our society's public intolerance of racial
and religious discrimination as evidenced in our Civil
79

See 818 F.2d at 1570.

80

Id.

81

Id. at 1571.

82 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Heavy Lift Serv., Inc., 607 F.2d 1121, 1123 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting
Federal Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1043, 1044 (5th Cir. 1976))).
83 Id. at 1573-74.
84 Id. at 1574 (quoting NLRB v. Claxton Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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Rights statutes. Although feelings of racial and religious
bias may, unfortunately, be harbored personally, an appeal
to such feelings has no place in our system of justice.
Neither does it have any place in a union election if it
unduly interferes with holding such an election under
"ideal" or "laboratory" conditions .... 85
M & M offers a sensible solution to the difficulty presented by the
ethnic hostility of employees and other third parties. The Board's
standard-that the speech must have rendered a fair election
"impossible"-demands an infeasible level of proof. Logically, it is
insuperably difficult to conclude that an occurrence is utterly impossible.
Furthermore, workers are entitled to reasonable assurances of a fair and
free election, not just the dim hope that one may take place against all
odds. By steering attention back toward the goal of providing a rational,
democratic atmosphere, the Eleventh Circuit cogently iterated the need to
protect the workers' franchise from hateful and distracting anti-Jewish
cant.
C. Shoemaker Without Soul: The Board's
ContinuingLack of Vigilance
The Board's series of judicial reversals has not given it an enhanced
sense of responsibility for ensuring the integrity of elections. To the
contrary, the Board seems incorrigibly wed to a policy of nonintervention
in campaigns marked by anti-Semitism. This administrative intransigence
lends little hope for those dedicated to the ideal of clean, rational elections
86
as envisioned in General Shoe.

Despite reversals by appellate courts in three different circuits, the
Board implicitly continues to follow Paula Shoe. 87 In Brightview Care
Center, Inc.,88 the employer protested losing an election in which he
allegedly had been the target of anti-Semitic remarks. 89 The regional
director disagreed, arguing that there was no evidence the union was

85 Id. at 1574 (citation omitted).
86 For discussion of General Shoe, see supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
87 For discussion of Paula Shoe, see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
88 292 N.L.R.B. 352 (1989).
89 Id. at 352. The alleged anti-Semitic remarks included "the owners would not give us raises
because they were Jews and cheap," and "maybe Hitler did the right thing." Id. at 352 n.2.
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responsible for such remarks, had run a racist campaign, or that the
election atmosphere had been "permeated" by anti-Semitism. 90
As the employer correctly argued, this simply was not the proper
standard. Citing Sewell, Silverman's, and M & M (among others), the
employer emphasized that the relevant issue was not whether the union
was responsible for the slurs, but whether the remarks "destroyed the
atmosphere necessary to the exercise of free choice in the representation
election." 91 Despite these valid points, the Board offered a multi-pronged
rejection of the employer's appeal. It attempted to distinguish each of the
employer's precedents, arguing that the slurs were disseminated by the
employer in Sewell, by a union officer in Silverman's, and by an
outspoken, union-supporting worker in M & M. In contrast, there was no
evidence concerning the union sympathies of the alleged bigots in this
case. 92 Such distinctions are specious. The Board obstinately refused to
acknowledge the unifying theme of these decisions: that workers
deserve-and the Board should provide-elections free from the taint of
hate-mongering, regardless of the speaker. General Shoe entitles workers
to a reasonably clean democratic laboratory, not just one unmarked by the
93
mud of either employers or unions.
The Board then replicated its Paula Shoe shuffle between "isolated"
and "sustained" ethnic assaults:
In Sewell, the Board held that it would set aside elections
when a party embarks on a campaign which seeks to
overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant,
inflammatory appeals. Sewell itself involved a party's
sustained course of conduct, deliberate and calculated in
intensity, to appeal to racial prejudice. The Board in Sewell
distinguished such conduct from isolated, casual,

90 Id. at 352.
91 Id. It is noteworthy that, with the exception of Sewell, all the cases the employer relied upon
were decisions by appellate courts rather than the Board.
92 Id.

93 The Board frequently, for example, has invalidated elections in which the parties' behavior was
beyond reproach, but the Board's own agent acted in a manner suggesting favoritism toward either
management or the union. See, e.g., Athbro Precision Eng'g Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 966 (1967)
(vacating election where Board agent drank beer with union representative during a break in the
polling), vacated sub nom. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 67
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2361 (D.D.C. 1968), acq. in result, 171 N.L.R.B. 21 (1968), enforced, 423 F.2d

573 (1st Cir. 1970). For a detailed discussion of such third-party contamination, see John W.
Teeter, Jr., Keeping the Faith: The Problem of Apparent Bias in Labor Representation Elections, 58
U. Cin. L. Rev. 909 (1990).
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remarks. The Board has adhered to this

94

Such logic rests on a fatal misreading of Sewell. Sewell, although
stating that the Board will not set aside an election if a party "does not
deliberately seek to overstress and exacerbate racial feelings by irrelevant,
inflammatory appeals," emphasizes that the issue or statement must first
be truthful. 95 The Board could have argued that an employee uttering
"maybe Hitler did the right thing" was not part of a deliberate effort, but it
is disingenuous to suggest the statement was either truthful, temperate, or
germane as required by Sewell. Under Sewell, therefore, the election
should have been overturned regardless of any fanciful line drawing
'
between what is deemed "isolated" or "sustained.

96

In Benjamin Coal Co., 97 a complex case involving numerous unfair
labor practices by the employer, the Board again shirked its duty to
safeguard elections. After the union lost a second election, 98 it sought
enforcement of a "Gissel bargaining order." 99 The union based its request
on the majority support it received in the first election and the employer's
pervasive unfair labor practices during the second campaign. 00 In
response, the employer argued that a Gissel order was inappropriate

94 Brightview, 292 N.L.R.B. at 352 (citations omitted) (quoting Beatrice Grocery Prods., Inc., 287
N.L.R.B. 302, 302 (1987) (holding that a union representative's accusation that a senior manager
made anti-black remarks did not warrant vacating the election whether the accusation was true or
false)).
95 138N.L.R.B. at71-72.
96 Indeed, the Board chairman made essentially the same point in his dissent to Beatrice Grocery.
287 N.L.R.B. at 304-05 (emphasizing that "for a racial message to be permissible under Sewell, it
must be both truthful and germane" and criticizing the majority's diminution of the event as being
"without effect").
97 294 N.L.R.B. 572 (1989).
98 The union had won the first election, but the employer filed numerous objections, and the union
decided to consent to a new election instead of litigating the matter. Id. at 572 n.7.
99 A Gissel order is labor law shorthand for a Board decision ordering an employer to bargain
with a union "where an employer has committed... unfair labor practices which have made the
holding of a fair election unlikely or which have in fact undermined a union's majority and caused
an election to be set aside." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969). Gissel orders
are not automatic for any employer misconduct; they generally are reserved for egregious and
pervasive violations of the Act. For a sobering analysis of the strengths and limits of Gissel orders,
see Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1793-95 (1983).
100 Benjamin Coal, 294 N.L.R.B. at 572. The employer's unfair labor practices included coercive
interrogation of employees regarding their support of the union, promising and providing benefits
to employees conditioned on their rejection of the union, and physically assaulting an employee for
supporting the investigation of unfair labor practices. Id. at 614.
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because numerous anti-Semitic comments during the first election so
tainted the result that it was unreliable as an expression of majority
union
support for the union.1 01 In particular, the employer alleged that the
02
1
campaign.
its
propel
to
anti-Semitism
to
appeals
had made blatant
The ALJ rebuffed this assertion in a manner exemplifying the Board's
apparently ingrained refusal to deter anti-Semitic campaigns. Whereas
Paula Shoe and its progeny held that Jew-bashing was too isolated to
invalidate an election, here the ALJ concluded that anti-Semitism was too
widespread for such a consequence. Pleading impotence in the face of
history, the ALJ opined:
[I]t is nothing less than regrettable that workplace antiSemitism has been rampant for many years in the Benjamin
operation. Convincing evidence establishes that rank-andfile employees, foremen, and high-ranking management
officials ... were guilty of ethnic slurs against the
Benjamins. Yet, the insulting and profane references
contributed by prounion employees to this unfortunate
history were not shown to have varied from the manner in
which hcstility, anger, and frustration were directed toward
their employer over the years. The entire phenomenon
might well be categorized as impassioned obscenity, rather
than a calculated effort to exacerbate racial or religious
feelings. However disgraceful these remarks, there is no
basis for finding that the Union was responsible for them.
103

The ALJ's excuse is disconcerting, for the Board compounds
insensitivity with inconsistency when it attempts to have it both ways:
either anti-Semitism is too minimal to warrant treatment or it is too
metastasized to be surgically corrected. In neither instance has the Board
shown the courage and concern to engage in the admittedly difficult yet
important task of taking concrete action-such as invalidating electionsto stem the use of anti-Jewish campaign tactics.
The Board, not surprisingly, fully embraced the ALJ's approach. The
Board emphasized that these were third-party remarks and that union

101 Id. at 572.
102 Id. at 610. The decision does not detail what these comments were.
103 Id. at 611.
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10 4
officials did not "echo or condone these highly offensive sentiments."
The Board then argued:

To hold that the election was tainted by such prejudice
would be to hold that no election could ever be held in any
plant with a prejudiced work force unless the union
attempting the campaign were able to accomplish what
management itself had been unable to do before the union
came on the scene, namely, eliminate all expressions of
10 5
racial, ethnic, or religious bias.
This argument is utterly hollow. Admittedly, labor law is not for the
squeamish, 10 6 and elections will never be certifiably free from the vagaries
of human prejudice. The immediate objective, however, is not to
transform workers into champions of ethnic harmony, but to ensure that
anti-Semitism is vigorously deterred as a campaign tool. To abort this
mission on the grounds that perfection eludes us is an abdication of the
Board's duty to protect the workers' freedom to make deliberate, rational
determinations of their organizational status.
The Board, unfortunately, is not the sole transgressor in neglecting the
laboratory. In contrast to other jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
10 7
Board's do-nothing philosophy in Did Building Services, Inc. v. NLRB
Once again, an employer challenged the union's election victory because
of anti-Jewish rhetoric, 10 8 and once again the Board trivialized the
employer's complaint. Here, a vocal union-supporting employee allegedly
told a supervisor "that the Mexicans should get together and that the
Union would protect them against gringos and Jews, that those people
never do anything for the workers, and that the Union is for the poor
104 Id.at 573.
105 Id.

106 For a humorous yet disturbing account of life in the field, see Lee Modjeska, Reflections of a
Labor Lawyer, 8 Lab. Law. 1 (1992). As Modjeska describes it,
Labor practice demands unique skills. Unrecorded labor history has it, for
example, that John L. Lewis, former president of the United Mine Workers,
regarded a "cast-iron ass" as the prime requisite of a good negotiator.
Dissembling qualities are also vital, as in "this is absolutely our last and final
offer," or "we had no idea he was a union activist when we fired him." In
particular settings, the abilities to tolerate thick smoke and raw bourbon are
essential. Further, racial, ethnic, sexual and religious sensitivities are sorely
tested.
Id. at 2.
107 915 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990).
108 Id. at 491.
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people and for the Mexicans ... ,"109 This remark allegedly was made
shortly before the election and purportedly was heard by several
coworkers. 110 Other workers also testified that this employee liked to
characterize the employer as a Jew who was exploiting the workers. "'
The hearing officer discounted most of this and similar testimony and
decided that none of the slurs had impaired the voters' freedom of
choice.' 1 2 The Board agreed, stating:
[T]he comments made by [the] employee.., are troubling
and we certainly do not condone the use of such terms
occurring in the context of a Board conducted election.
However, here the evidence as credited by the Hearing
Officer establishes that the comments were made on a
single occasion by a pro-union employee in a manner that
could not reasonably create the appearance that his remarks
represented the views of the Union; and there is no
evidence that the Union had notice that he had made such
remarks, so its failure to repudiate them has no
significance. Under these circumstances, we find no basis
113
for setting aside the election ....
On review, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the anti-Semitic
remarks were "reprehensible and could not conceivably have been
germane to any legitimate election issue."' 1 4 Indeed, such slurs "sought to
1 15
set the Mexican employees against the 'gringo,' Jewish owner."
Nonetheless, the court upheld the Board's conclusion. The Ninth Circuit
stressed that the employee's remarks were "isolated," that he "held no
position of influence over his co-workers," and that the union never
ratified his attacks."t 6 Most importantly, the court announced that, "[t]o
require election invalidation, an employee's appeal to prejudice must so

109 Id.

110Id. The supervisor also testified that he had overheard the employee making anti-Jewish
comments to two other workers. Id.
1 I d. at 492.
112 Id. at 492-93.
113 Id. at 493.
114

Id. at 498.

115 Id. at 499.
116 Id. at 499-500.
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taint the election atmosphere as to render free choice of representation
7
impossible." 1
Did falters on numerous levels. First, it repeats the Paula Shoe mistake
of suggesting that some unspecified level of anti-Jewish propaganda is
acceptable so long as it arguably may be labeled "isolated," "solitary," or a
"mere mention." This is disheartening to those seeking clean elections
where voters rationally cast ballots based on an informed calculus of their
economic and other work-related interests. Second, the Ninth Circuit
failed to grasp that the speaker's non-supervisory status may well have
amplified the impact of his remarks. Unlike employers and unions, whom
workers may view with suspicion, a rank-and-file employee may enjoy an
intimacy with coworkers that adds both urgency and plausibility to his
slurs. Third, the union's innocence does not alter the reality that its victory
occurred in a setting illegitimatized by ethnic libel. Fourth, the court's
adoption of an "impossibility" standard effectively would guarantee that
no elections could ever be overturned based on a third party's racist
campaign tactics.
1 18
Did proved to be an aberration among appellate opinions, however,
and the Ninth Circuit itself took a better-reasoned approach in NLRB v.
9 In National Research Group, pro-union
National Research Group, Inc. 11
employees left threatening, obscene, and anti-Semitic messages on the
answering machine of a group of anti-union coworkers. The Board
overruled the employer's objection to the union's electoral victory and
certified the results. 120 The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that this
alleged misconduct merited an evidentiary hearing and refused to enforce
the Board's bargaining order. 121 Upon remand, an ALJ ruled that the
117 Id. at 498 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
118

At first glance, it appears that NLRB v. Carl Weissman & Sons, Inc., 849 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1988) (per curiam), enforcing Case 19-CA-18672, 1987 WL 90210 (FLB-NLRB) (N.L.R.B. Feb. 5,
1987), is a second instance where the Ninth Circuit condoned the Board's attitude towards antiSemitic campaign tactics. However, on closer examination, it is clear that the court's opinion in
Weissman was not based on a substantive approval of the Board's rational for accepting the
election results. In Weissman, the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's decision not to grant a hearing
on the employer's objections to the election results. Id. at 452. The Board had invalidated the first
election because of a union official's anti-Semitic remark, id. at 450, but then decided to hold the
rerun election a mere sixty-seven days after the slur was uttered, id. at 452. When the union again
prevailed, the employer asserted that the Board had not allotted sufficient time for the prejudicial
taint to dissipate. Id. at 451. The Board tersely rejected that claim, however, and the Ninth Circuit
enforced the rejection, ruling that it was not an abuse of discretion for the Board to refuse to hold a
hearing concerning the employer's assertions. Id. at 452.
119 No. 92-70701, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7173 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 1994) (mem.).
120 Case 31-CA-19306, 1992 NLRB LEXIS 951 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 10, 1992).
121 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 7173, at *3.
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election should be vacated. As he explained, the anti-Semitic slur, when
combined with the threats, "tended to create a general atmosphere of fear
and coercion. ' 122 Unfortunately, the ALJ did not address whether the slur,
taken by itself, would have constituted a breach of laboratory conditions.
The Board's 1995 opinion in Catherine's, Inc.123 offers further
evidence that the Board's weakness may be incorrigible. Here, the crux of
the employer's objection centered on a union representative's comments at
a campaign meeting with several dozen workers. A worker asked if the
employer's attorney was Jewish and the union representative responded
affirmatively. 124 The representative then added "that it had been [his]
experience over the years as a union rep that Jewish people would fight
you and they would fight you hard, but when you beat them, they would
125
sit down and negotiate a contract with you.'
The hearing officer found this unobjectionable. While conceding that
the union representative's remarks were "politically incorrect," he
concluded that they did "not rise to the level of religious slurs" and, in an
ironic way, could even be viewed as a compliment to Jews. 126 He therefore
recommended that the employer's objection be dismissed, and the Board
affirmed that decision. 127 The hearing officer's analysis reflects an
inadequate understanding of the insidious nature of prejudice. Any
stereotype is potentially destructive, for by definition it strips the target of
his or her individuality. The ethnicity of the employer's attorney was not
conceivably germane to the election, and the union representative only
worsened the impact of the worker's query by using stereotypes in his
response.
Furthermore, the union representative's supposed "compliment" must
be appraised as part of the broader anti-Semitic overtones running through
the campaign. For example, an employee swore under oath that the union
representative gratuitously remarked that the employer was Jewish, that
either the union representative or another worker claimed Jews disliked
whites and blacks, and that such statements prompted widespread
discussion among employees. 128 Indeed, yet another worker testified that
122 Case 31-CA-19306, 1995 NLRB LEXIS 228, at *10 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 13, 1995).
12 3 316 N.L.R.B. 186 (1995).
124 Id. at 186.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 189-90.
127 Id. at 186, 190.
128 Id. at 187.
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fellow workers endorsed black solidarity with statements laden with antiSemitic overtones:
[The employee] testified that prior to the union campaign,
no one at Catherine's had ever said anything to the effect
that black employees had to stick together against white
employees in the workplace. [The employee] also testified,
that during the campaign, [a coworker] made remarks
concerning Catherine's' chairman, Bernard Wein, "Well,
he's Jewish. He don't care. He's got his pockets full.
You're the one who need [sic] to try to make some
money." 129
The hearing officer confessed that he had "no basis for discrediting" that
testimony but found it lacked legal significance. 130 He proceeded to quash
this objection because the union never authorized, condoned, or echoed
13
such slurs. '
Once again, this resolution avoids the overarching issue. Regardless of
the union's stance, it is unquestionable that the campaign was corrupted by
stereotypes, race-baiting, anti-Jewish rhetoric, and other statements which
were neither truthful, temperate in tone, nor germane. To uphold the
election's results under these circumstances does violence to both Sewell
and General Shoe.
III.

MYSTERIES OF INTERPRETATION

The Board's approach to anti-Semitic campaign tactics has been a
study in indifference. Despite its disapproving rhetoric, the Board almost
uniformly has failed to deter the use of anti-Jewish propaganda in
representation elections. The Third, 132 Seventh, 133 Ninth, 134 and Eleventh

Circuits 35 have shown greater sensitivity, but the Board's
nonacquiescence in those judicial decisions undermines their prophylactic
value. Instead of consistent administrative vigilance, parties seeking to
vindicate the integrity of elections must depend on the episodic, case-bycase intervention of the circuit courts.
129 Id. at 188.
130 Id.

131 Id. at 189 (citing Benjamin Coal Co., 294 N.L.R.B. 572 (1989)).
132 See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.

19981

Anti-Semitism and the NLRB

367

The Board's apparent indifference to anti-Jewish campaign tactics
raises an obvious question: Is such a lack of concern confined to antiSemitism or does it extend to other forms of group disparagement? The
answer is difficult to ascertain because the Board's overall application of
Sewell has not been consistent.1 36 Furthermore, the Board has drawn a
rather tenuous line between what it considers an acceptable appeal to
racial solidarity and what it views as impermissible race-baiting. 37 AntiSemitism, however, does seem to be treated in a particularly cavalier
fashion. Whereas the Board repeatedly has voided other ethnically
inflamed elections, 138 it almost uniformly has done nothing to deter antiJewish ploys. No simple answer for this phenomenon is available, but
several theories may offer at least a partial explanation.
First, one must recognize that the Board's failure to address antiSemitism within the workplace with the care it deserves manifests a larger
cultural failing. Such malign neglect is equally discernable in
organizational behaviorism and human-resource management scholarship.
As Professor Korman observes, "Anti-Semitism in the work setting has
39
been a 'non-topic' in the fullest sense of the word" among such experts.1
136 See, e.g., Robert E. Williams, NLRB Regulation of Election Conduct 107 (rev. ed. 1985)
(concluding that "[tlhe continuing discrepancy between actual results and the language of Sewell
creates uncertainty over Board policy"); Charlotte LeMoyne, Comment, The Unresolved Problem
of Race Hate Speech in Labor Union Elections, Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 77, 96-97 (1993)
(observing that Sewell has been "difficult to apply" and has led to "inconsistent condemnation and
affirmation of similar types of speech").
The Board's ambivalence about the impact of ethnic and racial disparagement is reflected in its
conflicting approaches to efforts to arouse anti-Japanese sentiments. In YKK (USA) Inc., 269
N.L.R.B. 82 (1984), the Board vacated an election based on the union's racist diatribes and acts of
violence, whereas it permitted a subtler yet similar strategy in KI (USA) Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 1063
(1992), enforcement denied, 35 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1994).
137 See, e.g., Archer Laundry Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1427 (1965) (upholding election despite the
union's caricature of the employer as a "fat white man" and implication conveyed in a number of
pamphlets that only an "Uncle Tom" would oppose unionization).
138 This has been true both prior to and after its decision in Sewell. See, e.g., YKK (USA) Inc., 269
N.L.R.B. 82 (1984) (vacating election as a result of anti-Japanese activities); Caribe Gen. Elec.,
Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 773 (1969) (vacating election as a result of anti-Puerto Rican comments); Bush
Hog, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1575 (1966) (vacating election based on a finding that anti-black
comments were made), enforced, 405 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1968); Universal Mfg. Corp. of Miss., 156
NLRB 1459 (1966) (vacating election as a result of anti-black propaganda); Boyce Mach. Corp.,
141 N.L.R.B. 756 (1963) (vacating election as a result of anti-white statements); Associated
Grocers of Port Arthur, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 468 (1961) (vacating election as a result of anti-black
comments); Southern Car & Mfg. Co.,106 N.L.R.B. 144 (1953) (vacating election as a result of
implied threats to black employees); P. D. Gwaltney, Jr. & Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 371 (1947) (vacating
election on grounds that threats of revival of Ku Klux Klan contributed to coercion of black
employees).
139 See Abraham K. Korman, Anti-Semitism in Organizations and the Behavioral Sciences:
Towards a Theory of Discrimination in Work Settings, 9 Contemp. Jewry 63, 76 (1988).
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The Board thus lacks any empirical matrix against which to assess
Judeopathic behavior in representation elections. 140 Furthermore, there is a
lack of visibility: anti-Semitism has not received the same level of public
attention as discrimination against people of color. In fact, "there has been
a virtually total lack of interest in anti-Semitism by the major civil-rights
groups in this country." 14
' Finally, the common perception (regardless of
its accuracy) that Jewish Americans are relatively affluent may temper the
indignation aroused by anti-Semitism. This may be attributable to a
specious sense that Jews have the economic muscle to defend their
interests and thus need little protection. 142 Such an attitude, however.
lamentable, may be exacerbated when the target of such abuse is a Jewish
employer.
These explanatory factors cannot excuse the Board's performance, and
it is pure speculation what role, if any, they have played in particular
cases. It would be unduly sanguine, however, to believe the Board is
immune from the misperceptions and attitudinal assumptions that
permeate American culture. As Roberto Unger has recognized, any
bureaucracy must "draw its staff and its purposes" from society and will
140 Of course, even if such studies existed, there is no guarantee that the Board would consult
them. As Professor Edley states:
The National Labor Relations Board is an especially easy target for skeptics of
agency expertise, consistency and neutrality. From its inception, the
controversial nature of the NLRB's business has subjected it to attack, and not
without reason. With respect to expertise, it has been observed that courts
routinely incant that the board is expert in industrial relations, so that it can
evaluate the effects of suspect management actions on workers; yet the board
does no empirical work, nor does its staff include experts in social science,
industrial relations, or business administration who might ably address such
questions.
Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy 51
(1990).
141 Korman, supra note 139, at 80. Korman adds that "[n]o group now exists which devotes a
major effort to dealing with work-related anti-Semitism, there have been no conferences or
meetings on the topic, and there have been few publications devoted to increasing the work
opportunities of members of the Jewish community." Id. at 80-81. See also Stephen L. Slavin &
Mary A. Pradt, The Einstein Syndrome: Corporate Anti-Semitism in America Today 169 (1982)
(asserting that the effort of Jewish organizations to combat workplace anti-Semitism "has been
applied infrequently, inconsistently, and to only a minimal effect").
142 Korman characterizes this attitude as, "[W]hy be concerned if the person has money, even if it
is unfair that he or she is being discriminated against?" Korman, supra note 139, at 81. Korman
goes on to note "that Jews' supposed lack of economic need is for the most part an inaccurate
perception of the actual economic status of American Jews." Id. See also Alan M. Dershowitz,
Chutzpah 3 (1991) (asserting that American Jews "worry about charges.., of being too rich");
Slavin & Pradt, supra note 141, at I (noting the ill-conceived sentiment that "since Jews are
apparently doing quite well economically, perhaps they should just count their blessings and thank
God to be living in the land of opportunity").
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therefore reflect and reinforce that community's patterns of domination
and dependence. 143 On some level, therefore, the fault lies not with the
Board but in ourselves.144
CONCLUSION

Although the roots of the Board's recurrent failures may be difficult to
discern, there are four fundamental flaws in its reasoning that readily can
be addressed. First, the Board dogmatically has adhered to the
misconception it displayed in Paula Shoe 145 that some unspecified level of
anti-Semitism is tolerable so long as it is sufficiently casual or isolated.
This "little bit won't hurt" complacency embodies an appalling lack of
empathy for the targets of racist jibes, and it seems particularly callous
toward what has been described as "the most vilified and persecuted
minority in history."' 146 The Paula Shoe standard is also unacceptably
imprecise. There is no clear indication of when ethnic slurs reach such a
pitch that they can no longer be ignored or dismissed with a pious lecture.
Such vagueness only begets uncertainty and generates litigation.147 The
Sewell standard, 148 that elections will be upheld when they include the use
of racial propaganda only if the statements are truthful, germane, and
temperate in tone, 49 is a far clearer approach to the difficulties posed by
the use of racial propaganda in representation elections.
The Board's second primary error has been to apply an unobtainable
standard for invalidating elections based on third-party hate tactics. By
repeatedly holding that third-party bigotry will invalidate elections only
where it renders a free choice "impossible," the Board has given virtual
carte blanche to Judeopathic workers and others not formally aligned with
the employer or the union. To impose a standard that the victims of antiSemitism never can reach is both senseless and legally unjust.

143 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Law in Modem Society 60-61 (1976).
144 The Supreme Court may bear some culpability as well. Despite the critical nature of this
problem and the intransigent doctrinal conflict, the Court has never addressed the issues raised by
Sewell.
145 For discussion of PaulaShoe, see supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
146 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).

147 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 511 (3d ed. 1986).
148 For discussion of Sewell, see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
149 Sewell, 138 N.L.R.B. at 71-72.
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The Board's third transgression is to ignore its own culpability. By
certifying racism-ridden elections, the Board enables anti-Semites. Simple
vows of disapproval count for nothing in the face of a refusal to invoke
available means of redress and deterrence. There can be no genuine
reproach in the absence of a concrete remedy. As one writer has
commented, "[I]f we do not reproach those who are slandering, we
150
ourselves are slanderers."
Fourth, the Board continues to ignore the serious nature of this issue;
this is not mere quibbling over faux pas. The Board's lack of vigilance
raises concerns over its commitment to both ethnic tolerance and shopfloor democracy. There is no room to accommodate malign neglect; we
need "uncompromising opposition to the considerable anti-Semitism
151
that ... still exists today.

152
Society cannot always reach the hearts and minds of Judeopaths.
Certainly, however, it can limit their role in labor representation elections.
Where the employer or union is responsible for an ethnic slur, the solution
is simple: it should suffer the automatic, per se invalidation of any election
it wins. Such a flat, prophylactic rule would clarify the Sewell doctrine,
reduce litigation, and send the most potent message that anti-Jewish
appeals are intolerable.

In cases involving third-party slurs, the Board should adopt and refine
the Katz standard of "whether the inflammatory remarks could have
'153
impaired the employees' freedom of choice in the subsequent election.
This standard is not, of course, perfect; reasonable minds might differ as to
the likelihood that anti-Jewish tactics will undermine workers' deliberative
abilities. It is beyond question, however, that the standard enunciated in
150 Fred M. Zaitsu, Living Victoriously 54 (1995). In its defense, the Board might assert that at
least it does not prevent Jewish targets from exercising self-help. In Englewood Hosp., 318
N.L.R.B. 806 (1995), a company president informed employees that he had received an anonymous
letter of a grossly threatening and anti-Semitic nature. The president did not blame the union for the
letter, but he did express his understandable anger and noted that the "'environment that created
animosity between employees"' could be responsible. Id. at 806. In a divided opinion, the Board
overruled the hearing officer and held that the president had not run afoul of Sewell. Id. at 807. As
the Board noted, the president's remarks clearly "did not attack a particular racial, ethnic, or
religious group" and thus were unobjectionable. Id. Any other result arguably would constitute
blaming the victim. Regardless, the Board's acceptance of the employer's self-defense in no way
excuses its own failure to deter anti-Semitism.
151 Gary E. Rubin, A No-Nonsense Look at Anti-Semitism, Tikkun, May-June 1993, at 46, 82.
152 As one realist puts it, "Antisemites do not fade away; they simply die." Jerome A. Chanes,
Interpreting the Data: Antisemitism and Jewish Security in the United States, 28 Patterns of
Prejudice 87, 90 (1994).
153 701 F.2d at 707 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Katz is discussed supra at notes 65-75 and
accompanying text.
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Katz is a critical improvement over the Board's current approach to thirdparty slurs. The Board uses an "impossibility" standard that shields such
slurs from effective redress, whereas the Katz standard uses a common
sense test of possibility. If the slurs conceivably "could have" undermined
the democratic process, then a new election must be held.
To assure maximum effectiveness, the party defending the election's
legitimacy should bear the burden of proving that the Judeopathic tactics
could not have undermined the workers' freedom of choice. This
allocation would strengthen both parties' incentives to discourage anti154
Semitic outbursts and would be consistent with the spirit of Sewell.
More importantly, it would leave little room for artful dodging by antiSemites.
The Katz standard also supports the concern for laboratory
conditions. 55 In third-party cases, the goal should be less to hand down
retribution than to correct a critically flawed experiment in industrial
democracy. Holding new elections entails both public and private costs,
but such expenditures would not be prohibitive in view of the purposes
they would serve. That democracy and ethnic tolerance would both be
furthered is by no means coincidental. No fair system of representation
can exist if the underlying process is corrupted by ethnic or religious
hatred. It is time to discard the hole-ridden Paula Shoe and step, however
modestly, toward a world where we are all judged as individuals, and not
on the basis of the ethnic groups from which we come.

154 138 N.L.R.B. at 72 (explaining that "the burden will be on the party making use of a racial
message to establish that it was truthful and germane, and ... the doubt will be resolved against
him").
This allocation also would be consistent with the general treatment of equal protection
jurisprudence, which provides an informative parallel for the potential treatment of anti-Semitism.
See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977),
where the Supreme Court explained that:
Proof that the decision by the [defendant] was motivated in part by a racially
discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the
challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the
[defendant] the burden of establishing that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.
Id. at 270-71 n.21.

155 For discussion of the concern for laboratory conditions, see supra text accompanying note 33.

